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Abstract
This paper verifies a result of [9] concerning graphoidal structure of Shenoy’s
notion of independence for Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. Shenoy
proved that his notion of independence has graphoidal properties for positive
normal valuations. The requirement of strict positive normal valuations as pre-
requisite for application of graphoidal properties excludes a wide class of DS
belief functions. It excludes especially so-called probabilistic belief functions.
It is demonstrated that the requirement of positiveness of valuation may be
weakened in that it may be required that commonality function is non-zero for
singleton sets instead, and the graphoidal properties for independence of belief
function variables are then preserved. This means especially that probabilis-
tic belief functions with all singleton sets as focal points possess graphoidal
properties for independence .
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1 Introduction
The concept of conditional independence between two subsets of variables given a
third, well-known from probability theory [2, 5], has also been extensively studied
for other types of uncertainty measures in artificial intelligence, e.g. for Dempster-
Shafer belief function theory [9, 11, 1], Spohn’s epistemic belief theory [10, 3], Zadeh’s
possibility theory [9, 1].
The concept of conditional independence in probability theory has been inter-
preted in terms of relevance, that is given three disjoint subsets of variables r,s and
t, then r and s are conditionally independent given t means that the conditional
distribution of r given any values of s and t is governed by the value of t alone; the
value of s is irrelevant.
The conditional independence relation between subsets of variables in probability
theory possesses many interesting properties allowing for qualitative reasoning about
relevance of sets of variables. Pearl and Paz [5] have isolated a subset of these prop-
erties called the ”graphoidal axioms”. These axioms are satisfied by several ternary
relations beside probabilistic independence and therefore allow for a wider use of
techniques of qualitative reasoning about relevance for other calculi than probabil-
ity calculus. This is especially true of Shenoy’s valuation-based system concept of
independence [9] as well as for Cano at al. directed acyclic graph framework [1].
One of important issues closely related to graphoidal structures is the possibil-
ity of factorization of a joint uncertainty distribution (or, as called by Shenoy, joint
valuation). Factorization as such may, for some calculi (e.g. the probability theory,
Dempster-Shafer theory, possibility theory), be used for uncertainty propagation
[1, 8]. The interesting question is then to what extent factorization suitable for qual-
itative reasoning about relevance (graphoid) can be used for purposes of uncertainty
propagation and vice versa.
We have been interested particularly in factorization of Dempster-Shafer belief
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function for purposes of later use in uncertainty propagation. We have shown [4] that
no factorization may have simpler hypertree structure (required for Shenoy/Shafer’s
propagation scheme [8]) than one made of (in some sense) conditional factors. On the
other hand, Cano et al.[1] and Shenoy [9] elaborated axiomatic frameworks within
which any factorization of a belief function has graphoidal properties. However,
our notion of conditionality (called here subsequently anti-conditionality) and hence
of conditional independence differs to some extent from that of Cano et al.[1] and
Shenoy [9], in that axiomatic frameworks of [1] and [9] impose more severe restric-
tions onto the class of Dempster-Shafer belief functions considered. As a consequence,
there exist belief functions having hypertree factorizations in general, but not having
equivalent hypertree factorizations either in Cano et al. or in Shenoy framework.
Hence there exists a gap between the class of factorizations for purposes of uncer-
tainty propagation as proposed by Shenoy and Shafer [8] and factorizations known
to have graphoidal properties. The question emerges whether or not the classes of
DS belief function decompositions fulfilling graphoidal axioms can also be widened
beyond those considered in [1] and [9], and especially whether the notion of con-
ditionality and conditional decomposition as introduced in [4] is suitable for this
purpose.
The outline of the paper is as follows: in section 2 basic definitions of DST are
recalled. In section 3 the class of belief functions considered by Cano et al. [1]
is explained. Section 4 presents the class of belief functions considered by Shenoy
[9]. Section 5 presents our extension to the class of belief functions fulfilling the
graphoidal axioms. Some consequences are discussed in section 6.
2 Basic Definitions of DST
Let us first remind basic definitions of DST:
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Definition 1 Let Ξ be a finite set of elements called elementary events. Any subset
of Ξ be a composite event. Ξ be called also the frame of discernment.
A basic probability assignment function is any function m:2Ξ → [0, 1] such that
∑
A∈2Ξ
|m(A)| = 1, m(∅) = 0, ∀A∈2Ξ 0 ≤
∑
A⊆B
m(B)
(|.| - absolute value)
A belief function be defined as Bel:2Ξ → [0, 1] so that Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆Am(B)
A plausibility function be Pl:2Ξ → [0, 1] with ∀A∈2Ξ P l(A) = 1 − Bel(Ξ − A) A
commonality function be Q:2Ξ − {∅} → [0, 1] with ∀A∈2Ξ−{∅} Q(A) =
∑
A⊆Bm(B)
If for every A ⊆ Ξ we have m(A) ≥ 0, then we talk about proper belief functions.
If for every A ⊆ Ξ we have Q(A) ≥ 0, then we talk about pseudo-belief functions.
Furthermore, a Rule of Combination of two Independent Belief Functions Bel1,
Bel2 Over the Same Frame of Discernment (the so-called Dempster-Rule), denoted
BelE1,E2 = BelE1 ⊕BelE2
is defined as follows: :
mE1,E2(A) = c ·
∑
B,C;A=B∩C
mE1(B) ·mE2(C)
(c - constant normalizing the sum of |m| to 1)
Furthermore, let the frame of discernment Ξ be structured in that it is identical
to cross product of domains Ξ1, Ξ2, . . . Ξn of n discrete variables X1, X2, . . .Xn,
which span the space Ξ. Let (x1, x2, . . . xn) be a vector in the space spanned by
the variables X1, , X2, . . .Xn. Its projection onto the subspace spanned by variables
Xj1, Xj2, . . .Xjk (j1, j2, . . . jk distinct indices from the set 1,2,. . . ,n) is then the vector
(xj1 , xj2, . . . xjk). (x1, x2, . . . xn) is also called an extension of (xj1 , xj2, . . . xjk). A
projection of a set A of such vectors is the set A↓{Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk} of projections of
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all individual vectors from A onto Xj1, Xj2, . . .Xjk . A is also called an extension of
A↓{Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk}. A is called the vacuous extension of A↓{Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk} iff A contains all
possible extensions of each individual vector in A↓{Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk} . The fact, that A is
a vacuous extension of B onto space X1, X2, . . . Xn is denoted by A = B
↑{X1,X2,...Xn}
Definition 2 (see [8]) Let m be a basic probability assignment function on the space
of discernment spanned by variables X1, X2, . . . Xn. m
↓{Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk} is called the
projection of m onto subspace spanned by Xj1, Xj2, . . .Xjk iff
m↓{Xj1 ,Xj2 ,...Xjk}(B) = c ·
∑
A;B=A
↓{Xj1
,Xj2
,...Xjk
}
m(A)
(c - normalizing factor)
Definition 3 (see [8]) Let m be a basic probability assignment function on the space
of discernment spanned by variables Xj1, Xj2, . . .Xjk. m
↑{X1,X2,...Xn} is called the
vacuous extension of m onto superspace spanned by X1, X2, . . . Xn iff
m↑{X1,X2,...Xn}(B↑{X1,X2,...Xn}) = m(B)
and m↑{X1,X2,...Xn}(A) = 0 for any other A.
We say that a belief function is vacuous iff m(Ξ) = 1 and m(A) = 0 for any A
different from Ξ.
Projections and vacuous extensions of Bel, Pl and Q functions are defined with
respect to operations on m function. Notice that, by convention, if we want to
combine by Dempster rule two belief functions not sharing the frame of discernment,
we look for the closest common vacuous extension of their frames of discernment
without explicitly notifying it.
Definition 4 (See [7]) Let B be a subset of Ξ, called evidence, mB be a basic prob-
ability assignment such that mB(B) = 1 and mB(A) = 0 for any A different from
B. Then the conditional belief function Bel(.||B) representing the belief function Bel
conditioned on evidence B is defined as: Bel(.||B) = Bel ⊕BelB.
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Definition 5 (See [9] Two disjoint sets of variables p.q are said to be (uncondition-
ally) independent) iff
Bel↓p∪q = Bel↓p ⊕ Bel↓q
3 Cano’s et al. A Priori Conditionals in Directed
Acyclic Graphs
Cano et al. in [1] proposed a generalization of Pearl’s bayesian networks [6] to rep-
resent DS belief distribution factorization. They motivated their choice by stating
that ”graphical structures used to represent relationships among variables in our
work are Pearl’s causal networks [6], not Shenoy/Shafer’s hypergraphs [8], because
the former are more appropriate to represent independence relationships among vari-
ables in a direct way.” (p.257). They discovered also that Dempster-Shafer theory
needs two types of conditionality - the one introduced by Shafer [7] (see definition
4 above) which they call a-posteriori conditionality, which is not suitable for gen-
eralization of bayesian belief networks, and a different one, which they call a-priori
conditionality. On page 262 (Definition 2) they define a belief function Bel to be (a
priori) conditional belief function conditioned on variable set h by requiring Bel↓h
to be a vacuous belief function. This latter notion clearly generalizes probabilistic
conditionality in a way allowing for usage of probabilistic algorithms for uncertainty
propagation. However, it cannot handle various cases of functions which could be
factored in terms of a Dempster Rule of Combination.
As an example please verify, that the belief function Bel12
Bel12 = Bel1 ⊕Bel2
with focal points for Bel1, Bel2 (Bel1 defined for variables X,Y, Bel2 for variables
X,Z, domains of variables: X: {x1, x2}, Y: {y1, y2}, Z: {z1, z2})
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Bel1
set m1(set)
{(x1, y1), (x1, y2),
(x2, y1), (x2, y2)} 0.1
{(x1, y1)} 0.2
{(x1, y2)} 0.25
{(x2, y1)} 0.3
{(x2, y2)} 0.15
Bel1
set m2(set)
{(x1, z1), (x1, z2),
(x2, z1), (x2, z2)} 0.2
{(x1, z1)} 0.2
{(x1, z2)} 0.3
{(x2, z1)} 0.25
{(x2, z2)} 0.05
cannot be represented in a structured manner as a product of an unconditional and
(a priori) conditional belief function in sense of Cano et al.
4 Shenoy’s Notion of Conditionality
Shenoy [9] introduced a totally different notion of conditionality within his frame-
work of Valuation-Based Systems (VBS). Its starting point is to define conditional
independence in terms of factorization. VBS is defined by a system of axioms pre-
sented in that paper. Basic concepts of VBS are: the notion of a set of variables s
introduced on page 205, the notion of set of valuations Vs introduced on page 206,
the notion of set Ns of normal valuations on page 207, the notion of the set Us
of positive normal valuations (that of those normal valuations which have unique
identity with respect to the valuation combination operator ⊕) introduced on page
208-209.He defined conditional independence as follows: (Definition 3.1. p. 214)
Suppose γ ∈ Nw, suppose r,s,v are disjoint subsets of (the set of variables) w. Let
γ(t), t ⊆ w denote projection of γ onto subspace spanned by variables t. We say that
r and s are conditionally independent given v with respect to γ, written as r⊥γs|v
iff there exist αr∪v ∈ Vr∪v and αs∪v ∈ Vs∪v such that
γ(r ∪ s ∪ v) = αr∪v ⊕ αs∪v
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To prove that his notion of conditional independence (Definition 3.1.) is a
graphoid (a concept defined in [5]), he proves graphoidal properties in theorems
3.1.(symmetry), 3.2. (decomposition), 3.3.(weak union), 3.4.(contraction) and 3.5.
(intersection). Theorems 3.1.-3.4 are valid for normal valuations. The notion of
positive normal valuation is used in theorem 3.5 (intersection) p.219. The proof of
theorem 3.5 relies on the particular form of claim (7) of Lemma 3.1., and on the
fact that individual valuation identity turns to group identity in Ns if positiveness
is assumed.
Let us cite Shenoy’s Lemma 3.1., (page 215) claim 7, because it will constitute the
central point of our further interest : r⊥s|v equivalent to γ(r|s∪v) = γ(r|v)⊕τγ(s∪v)
The notion of conditionality (γ(r|v)) is introduced on page 213. ” Suppose σ ∈ Ns
and suppose a and b are disjoint subsets of s.. .... Let σ(b|a) denote σ↓a∪b ⊖ σ↓b.”
The removal operator ⊖ has been described by axioms R1,R2 and CR on page 212.
The τσ - the member identity - has been defined in axiom R2 on page 212.
We will omit here the citation of general definitions of the above-mentioned terms,
as they are lengthy and complicated, but we will concentrate on their meaning for
the Dempster-Shafer theory, as it is our main point of interest.
On page 224 the above-mentioned notions are specialized for DST:
A valuation for s is a function σ : 2Ws ← [0, 1]. This function σ is the commonality
function Q of DST. (We prefer notation Ξs in place of Ws for universe spanned by
variable set s; but we keep in this section denotation of Shenoy for easier cross-
reference).
σ is normal iff Σa∈2Ws ((−1)
|a|+1σ(a) = 1. This means actually that the sum of
all masses over all focal points has to be equal 1 (this differs a bit from definition 1
in this paper, as we assumed that the sum of absolute values of the mass function
over all focal points has to be equal 1. This results in a difference in scaling factor,
but has no further effect).
On page 225 the removal operator is introduced for DST. Suppose σ ∈ Vs and
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ρ ∈ Ns. Let K = Σa∈2Ws ,ρ(a)>0)((−1)
|a|+1σ(a)/ρ(a)). Then if K > 0 and ρ(a) > 0
then (σ ⊖ ρ)(a) = K−1σ(a)/ρ(a) and otherwise (σ ⊖ ρ)(a) = 0.
This means that the removal operator is defined for every set as division of common-
ality functions whenever the second commonality function takes positive values and
as 0 elsewhere, and the division is followed by normalization of mass function.
This implies that conditioning on the set of variables v in DST in Shenoy’s
framework is defined as division of commonality function by its projection onto the
set of variables v whenever the projected Q-function takes positive values and as
0 elsewhere, and the division is followed by normalization of mass function of the
result.
Under these circumstances the group identity for the space of normal valuations
is a belief function with the only focal point m(Ws) = 1, where Ws is the universe
(spanned by variables from set s). Member identities are usually complex constructs
with masses taking (positive and negative) integer values.
Obviously, then a valuation σ is positive normal iff σ(a) > 0 for every a ∈ 2Ws.
This means that m(Ws) > 0, where Ws is the universe.
Notions of conditionality of Shenoy [9] and of Cano et al. [1] are different in
general. But regrettably, in the interesting case of graphoidal properties positive
normality is required. And only for positive normal valuations in Dempster-Shafer
theory notions of conditionality of Shenoy [9] and of Cano et al. [1] coincide (clearly
in case when Cano conditionals exist at all) ! This actually means the following:
• Three exist belief functions which possess graphoidal decompositions in sense
of Cano et al. and in the sense of Shenoy such that qualitative relevance results
agree
• Three exist belief functions which possess graphoidal decompositions in the
sense of Shenoy such that qualitative independence between sets of variables
p,q given r is granted in Shenoy’s decomposition but no such decomposition in
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the sense of Cano et. al exists. This especially true for the example given at
the end of previous section.
• Three exist belief functions which possess graphoidal decompositions in the
sense of Cano et al. such that qualitative independence between sets of vari-
ables p,q given r is granted in Cano’s decomposition but no such decomposition
in the sense of Shenoy exists. It is the case for probability distributions. Prob-
ability distributions are considered as a special case of DS belief functions with
focal points only on singleton sets. Hence they are not positive valuations in
the sense of Shenoy (because probabilistic belief functions have more than one
valuation identity). )
Last not least let us notice that the notion of conditionality leads outside the
domain of proper belief functions of DST (those with nonnegative mass function)
and shifts the considerations into the area of pseudo-belief (those with non-negative
commonality function) [9]. Shenoy states on pp.225-226 ”Notice that if σ and ρ are
commonality functions, it is possible that σ⊖ ρ may not be a commonality function
because condition ... [of non-negativity of mass function] may not be satisfied by
σ ⊖ ρ In fact, if σ is a commonality function for s, and r ⊆ s, then even σ ⊖ σ↓r
may fail to be a commonality function. This fact is the reason why we need the
concept of proper valuation as distinct from non-zero and normal valuations in the
general VBS framework. An implication of this fact is that conditionals may lack
semantic coherence in the Dempster-Shafer’s theory. This is the primary reason why
conditionals are neither natural nor widely studied in the Dempster-Shafer’s belief-
function theory”. What is more - as Studeny claims at the end of his paper [11] -
even the notion of Shenoy’s conditional independence leads outside the domain of
proper belief functions. that is if p, q are independent given r with respect to proper
belief function Bel in the sense of Shenoy (as cited above), then there may NOT exist
two proper belief functions Bel1, Bel2 such that Bel1 is defined over space spanned
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by variables p ∪ r and Bel2 is defined over space spanned by variables q ∪ r and
Bel↓p∪q∪r = Bel1 ⊕ Bel2
holds.
5 Main Result
Below it is demonstrated that Shenoy’s valuation positiveness is not required in
order to achieve truth of intersection, and this due to the possibility of verifying the
contents of claim (7) of Lemma 3.1. of [9].
At the very beginning let us clarify why we (as well as other authors) do not
use Shafer’s definition of conditionality cited in definition 4 when talking about
independence. In general, independence is understood in terms of irrelevance. For
example, if in a probability distribution P in variables X, Y these variables X, Y
are mutually independent (P (Y |X = xi) is the same whatever value xi of X is
considered), then P (X, Y ) = P (X)cdotP (Y ) that is the interrelationship of X and
Y is irrelevant for representation the joint probability distribution.
But let us take the following belief distribution in variables X,Y, both variables
with domains of cardinality 2.
Focal m(focal)
{ (x1, y1), (x1, y2), (x2, y1) } 0.25
{ (x1, y1), (x1, y2), (x2, y2) } 0.25
{ (x1, y1), (x2, y1), (x2, y2) } 0.25
{ (x1, y2), (x2, y1), (x2, y2) } 0.25
Let ΞY = {y1, y2}. It is an easy task to check that for every (non-empty) subset S
of the domain of X Bel(||S × ΞY )
↓Y is the same that is the marginal distribution in
variable Y does not depend on X. But nonetheless Bel↓{X,Y } 6= Bel↓{X}⊕Bel↓{Y } as
definition 5 would require.
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Definition 6 For belief (or pseudo-belief) function Bel over discourse space spanned
by the set of variables V = {X1, X2, ....Xn} we define (anti)conditional belief function
BelV |p(A) of Bel conditioned on set of variables p, p ⊆ V from the set V as any
pseudo-belief function fulfilling the equation
Bel = Bel↓p ⊕ Bel|p (1)
REMARK: Obviously Q|p(A) = c · Q(A)
Q↓p(A)
(c - a mass assignment normalizing
constant, independent of A) for every set A such that Q↓p(A) 6= 0
Definition 7 For belief (or pseudo-belief) function Bel over discourse space spanned
by the set of variables V = {X1, X2, ....Xn} we say that Bel is compressibly indepen-
dent of a set of variables p from the set V iff the following equation holds
Bel = (Bel↓V−p)↑p (2)
(that is Bel is in fact a vacuous extension of another belief or pseudo-belief function
defined over space of discourse spanned by the set of variables V − p).
Notice that if the belief function Bel is compressibly independent of the set of
variables p then it can be represented in a ”compressed” way by the function Bel↓V −p.
REMARK: We assume that operators ↓, ↑, | are of same priority and are processed
from left to right, so that e.g. ((Bel↓p)|q)↑r is equivalent to saying Bel↓p|q↑r.
Please notice that if Bel is a belief function over discourse space spanned by
the set of variables V then a conditional belief function Bel|p (p ⊆ V ) may be
compressibly independent of the set of variables q (p ∩ q = ∅, q ⊆ V ) while at the
same time Bel itself may not be compressibly independent of the set of variables
q. Consider for example the belief function Bel in variables X,Y,Z. with domains
{x1, x2, x3}, {y1, y2, y3}, {z1, z2, z3}, and the following single focal point:
Focal m(focal)
{ (x1, y1, z1), (x2, y2, z2), (x3, y3, z3) } 1
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so that Bel is neither compressibly independent of X, nor of Y nor of Z. Furthermore,
no partition of the set of variables into independent subsets in the sense of Shafer is
possible, that is Bel 6= Bel↓{X,Y } ⊕ Bel↓{Z} etc.Then Bel↓{Y,Z} has focal point:
Focal m↓{Y,Z}(focal)
{ (y1, z1), (y2, z2), (y3, z3) } 1
and Bel↓{X,Y } has focal point:
Focal m↓{X,Y }(focal)
{ (x1, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y3) } 1
and Bel↓{Z} has the focal point:
Focal m↓{Z}(focal)
{ (z1), (z2), (z3) } 1
However, an (anti)conditional belief function Bel|{Y,Z} with following focal point:
Focal m|{Y,Z}(focal)
{ (x1, y1, z1), (x1, y1, z2), (x1, y1, z3) ,
(x2, y2, z1), (x2, y2, z2), (x2, y2, z3) ,
(x3, y3, z1), (x3, y3, z2), (x3, y3, z3) } 1
is compressibly independent of Z, that is there exists a(n anti)- conditional (Bel↓{X,Y })|{Y }
Focal m↓{X,Y }|{Y }(focal)
{ (x1, y1), (x2, y2), (x3, y3) } 1
such that Bel|{Y,Z} = ((Bel↓{X,Y })|{Y })↑{X,Y,Z}
Please pay attention to the fact that by definition there may be several distinct
(anti)conditional belief functions for a given function (unless we have to do with
positive normal valuations as defined by Shenoy). Consider for example the belief
function in two variables, X,Y with focal points:
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Focal m(focal)
{ (x1, y1), (x2, y2), } 0.75
{ (x1, y2), (x3, y3) } 0.25
for which at least two (anti)conditional belief functions Bel|Y are possible, one with
Focal m|{Y }(focal)
{ (x1, y1), (x1, y2), (x2, y2), (x3, y3) } 1
and the other with
Focal m|{Y }(focal)
{ (x1, y1), (x2, y2), } 0.5
{ (x1, y2), (x3, y3) } 0.5
This differs from the approach of Shenoy where the conditional belief had to be
unique, and the definition 6 covers both the concept of conditionality of Cano el al.
and of Shenoy. (By the way: the first conditional of the two above is in sense of
Shenoy, while the second in the sense of Cano et. al.).
It is obvious why ambiguity in definition of conditionals has been avoided by
Shenoy - because in his lemmas and theorems equations would have to be replaced
by existential statements. Subsequently we demonstrate that the ambiguity of the
definition 6 can be handled quite conveniently.
THEOREM 1 Let p, q, r be pairwise disjoint sets of variables and let V = p∪ q∪ r
and let Bel be defined over V. Furthermore let Bel|p∪r be a (anti)conditional Belief
conditioned on variables from p∪ r. Let this conditional distribution be compressibly
independent of r. Let Bel↓p∪q be the projection of Bel onto the subspace spanned
by p ∪ q. Then there exists Bel↓p∪q|p being a conditional belief of that projected
belief conditioned on the variable p such that this Bel|p∪r is the vacuous extension of
Bel↓p∪q|p
Bel|p∪r = (Bel↓p∪q|p)↑V (3)
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PROOF: By definition (see eqn(1)):
Bel = Bel↓p∪r ⊕ BelV |p∪r (4)
and hence (def.1)
m(A) =
∑
B,C;
B,C ⊆ Ξ,
A = B ∩C
m↓p∪r↑V (C) ·m|p∪r(B) (5)
As we assume the compressible independence of the conditional Belief Bel|p∪r
from the variable set r, so m|p∪r is being a vacuous extension of another distri-
bution, say m’, defined only over p∪q, so we in fact calculate the right-hand-side
sum as:
m(A) =
∑
b, c;
b ⊆ Ξp × Ξq,
c ⊆ Ξp × Ξr,
A = b↑V ∩ c↑V
m↓p∪r(c) ·m′(b) (6)
Let us marginalize both sides of eqn(6) over r (a ⊆ Ξp × Ξq):
m↓p∪q(a) =
∑
A;a=A↓p∪q


∑
b, c;
b ⊆ Ξp × Ξq,
c ⊆ Ξp × Ξr,
A = b↑V ∩ c↑V
m′(b) ·m↓p∪r(c)


(7)
Hence eliminating auxiliary set A we obtain:
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m↓p∪q(a) =
∑
b, c;
b ⊆ Ξp × Ξq,
c ⊆ Ξp × Ξr,
a = (b↑V ∩ c↑V )↓p∪q
m′(b) ·m↓p∪r(c) (8)
It is easily checked that if b ⊆ Ξp × Ξq and c ⊆ Ξp × Ξr then
(b↑V ∩ c↑V )↓p∪q = b ∩ (c↑V )↓p∪q (9)
But as c is defined over p ∪ r:
(c↑V )↓p∪q = (c↓p)↑p∪q (10)
Hence, by substituting eqn(9) and eqn(10) into eqn(8) we get:
m↓p∪q(a) =
∑
b, γ;
b ⊆ Ξp × Ξq,
γ ⊆ Ξp,
a = b ∩ γ↑p∪q
∑
c;
c ⊆ Ξp × Ξr,
γ = c↓p
m′(b) ·m↓p∪r(c) (11)
As b does not depend on c in the inner sum of eqn(11), we get :
m↓p∪q(a) =
∑
b, γ;
b ⊆ Ξp × Ξq,
γ ⊆ Ξp,
a = b ∩ γ↑p∪q
m′(b) ·
∑
c;
c ⊆ Ξp × Ξr ,
γ = c↓p
m↓p∪r(c) (12)
But by definition (of projection in DST) for γ ⊆ Ξp
∑
c;
c ⊆ Ξp × Ξr ,
γ = c↓p
m↓p∪r(c) = m↓p(γ) (13)
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Substituting eqn(13) into eqn(12), we obtain:
m↓p∪q(a) =
∑
b, γ;
b ⊆ Ξp × Ξq ,
γ ⊆ Ξp,
a = b ∩ γ↑p∪q
m′(b) ·m↓p(γ) (14)
But from definition of conditionality (eqn(1)) and the definition of belief func-
tion (see def.1) we know that:
m↓p∪q(a) =
∑
b, γ;
b ⊆ Ξp × Ξq ,
γ ⊆ Ξp,
a = b ∩ γ↑p∪q
m↓p∪q|p(b) ·m↓p(γ) (15)
Hence, by comparison of eqn(14) and eqn(15) we conclude that m′ must be
the mass function of a conditional belief function Bel↓p∪q|p so the claim of the
theorem is proven. Q.e.d.✷
The above theorem has an existential form: if the compressible independence of
conditional belief on a variable is given then there exists the compression similar to
Lemma 3.1. claim 7 of [9] in which valuation identity is replaced by group identity
even for normal valuations.
Let us notice that under the conditions of the above theorem (combining eqn(1)
and eqn(3))
Bel = Bel|p∪r ⊕ Bel↓p∪r = Bel↓p∪q|p ⊕ Bel↓p∪r (16)
and hence for any Bel↓p∪r|p
Bel = Bel↓p∪q|p ⊕ Bel↓p ⊕Bel↓p∪r|p (17)
and therefore
Bel = Bel↓p∪q ⊕ Bel↓p∪r|p (18)
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This means that whenever the conditional Belp∪q∪r|p∪r is compressibly indepen-
dent of r, then there exists a conditional Belp∪q∪r|p∪q compressibly independent of q.
But this fact combined with the previous theorem results in:
THEOREM 2 Let p, q, r be pairwise disjoint sets of variables. Let V = p ∪ q ∪ r
and let Bel be defined over V. Furthermore let Bel|p∪r be an (anti)conditional Belief
conditioned on variables p∪ r. Let this conditional distribution be compressibly inde-
pendent of r. Let Bel↓p∪q be the projection of Bel onto the subspace spanned by p∪q.
Then, for every Bel↓p∪q|p being a conditional belief of that projected belief conditioned
on the variables p its vacuous extension, (Bel↓p∪q|p)↑V is an (anti)conditional belief
function of Bel conditioned on variables p ∪ r.
We can easily check that Shenoy’s notion of conditionality implies existence of
conditional compressibly independent of a variable.
THEOREM 3 Let p.q.r be three disjoint sets of variables. Let Bel be a belief
function over space spanned by variables p∪ q∪ r. q, r are Shenoy-independent given
p iff there exist Bel↓p∪r|p and Bel|p∪q such that (Bel↓p∪r|p)↑p∪q∪r = Bel|p∪q (that is
there exists conditional on p ∪ q compressibly independent of q)
PROOF: By definition, q, r are Shenoy-independent given p iff there exist (pseudo-
) belief functions Bel2 over space p ∪ q Bel3 over space p ∪ r such that Bel =
Bel2 ⊕ Bel3. So the if-part is obvious given definition 6. But Bel = Bel2 ⊕
Bel3 implies also that Bel = (Bel
|p
2 ⊕ Bel
↓p
2 ) ⊕ Bel3. Hence Bel = Bel
|p
2 ⊕
(Bel↓p2 ⊕ Bel3). We choose the one Bel
|p
2 for which after division but before
normalizationm
|p
2 (Ξp×Ξq) = 1 and otherwisem
|p
2 (A) = 0 whenever Q
↓p
2 (A
↓p) =
0 (such one always exists). Clearly then (Bel
|p
2 )
↓p is the vacuous belief function.
But Bel↓p∪q = Bel↓p2 ⊕Bel3. Hence Bel
|p
2 is in fact a Bel
|p,q and therefore there
exists a conditional compressibly independent of q. Q.e.d.✷
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Let us now have a look at the intersection property required by Pearl and Paz
[5] for graphoidal structures. We insist here that we will work with more general DS
valuations than Shenoy [9] did, that is we explore the space of normal DS valuations.
First, however, let us look more closely at the very notion of independence.
We associate usually independence/dependence with the freedom/slavery concepts.
As (next to) great philosophers suggest and as life confirms, usually absolute freedom
and absolute slavery coincide. Speaking more seriously, there are cases in probability
calculus where dependence and independence cannot be distinguished. Two vari-
ables X,Y are usually said to be statistically independent when, whatever the value
of X and Y, always: P (X&Y ) = P (X) · P (Y ). Now let have P (X = x) = 1 and
P (X = ¬x) = 0, P (Y = y) = p and P (Y = ¬y) = 1 − p, Clearly, X and Y are in
that sense statistically independent - but they are possibly functionally dependent
(We can establish a function f : Y → X fitting the joint distribution of X and Y)!
A still worse case is when three (binary) variables, X,Y,Z, are connected by XOR
relationship: X xor Y =Z, with X,Y being uniformly distributed (P (X = x&Y =
y) = P (X = ¬x&Y = ¬y) = P (X = x&Y = ¬y) = P (X = ¬x&Y = y) = 0.25).
This would suggest that X,Y are independent. But also X,Z are then ”independent”
as well as Y,Z. Still another peculiarity occurs when X=Y and Y=Z. Then X,Y are
conditionally independent given Z, X,Z are conditionally independent given Y, Z,Y
are conditionally independent given X. The latter case is, by the way, a justification
why Shenoy did not allow for a general normal valuation when considering intersec-
tion axiom of graphoids. If we want to observe intrinsic independence, we need to
see diversity of behaviors. Otherwise we do not know whether no change in one’s
behavior is a response or a selfishness of a variable. Therefore we need a notion of
diversity.
Definition 8 A (proper or pseudo) belief function Bel defined over the space Ξ
spanned by the set of variables V is said to be diverse (with respect to V ) iff for
every ξ ∈ Ξ we have Q(ξ) 6= 0 (that is commonality of singleton sets is non-zero).
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Notice that the property of diversity is retained for both proper and pseudo belief
functions for operations of vacuous extension and anticonditioning and combination
of belief functions via Dempster rule of combination, but it is retained only for proper
belief functions for operation of marginalization.
Under the conditions of this definition we say that
Definition 9 Let p.q.r be three disjoint sets of variables. Let Bel be a belief function
over space spanned by variables p ∪ q ∪ r. q, r are intrinsically independent given p
iff Bel is diverse (with respect to to the variables p ∪ q ∪ r) and there exist Bel↓p∪r|p
and Bel|p∪q such that (Bel↓p∪r|p)↑p∪q∪r = Bel|p∪q (that is there exists conditional on
p ∪ q compressibly independent of q)
It is an easy task to check exploiting results of Shenoy [9] - that intrinsic indepen-
dence relation fulfills the graphoidal requirements of symmetry, decomposition, weak
union and contraction for proper belief functions, as operations of marginalization
and anticonditioning preserve the property of diversity.
The last graphoidal property, intersection property, is proved below as
THEOREM 4 Let p, q, r, s be pairwise disjoint sets of variables. Let Bel be a proper
belief function defined over the set of variables V = p ∪ q ∪ r ∪ s. If q and s are
intrinsically independent given p ∪ r and r and s are intrinsically independent given
p ∪ q then also q ∪ r and s are intrinsically independent given p.
PROOF: Let us first notice that if a (pseudo-) belief function Bel1 defined over
the space spanned by variables p∪ q (p and q disjoint) is defined in such a way
that Bel1 = (Bel
↓p
1 )
↑p∪q then for every subset A of the discourse space Ξp×Ξq
Q1(A) = Q1((A
↓p)↑p∪q) holds.
Bel1 = (Bel
↓p
1 )
↑p∪q → Q1(A) = Q1((A
↓p)↑p∪q) (19)
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Now let us consider a function Bel defined over space spanned by variables
p, q, r, s, where independence conditions hold as required by the premise of the
theorem. Then definition 6 and theorem 3 imply
Bel↓p∪q∪r ⊕ Bel↓p∪q∪s|p∪q = Bel = Bel↓p∪q∪r ⊕ Bel↓p∪r∪s|p∪r (20)
Let V = p∪ q ∪ r ∪ s and let Bel be a function defined over the space spanned
by V .
Let us consider subsequently only unnormalized conditional Q’s (commonality
functions, def. 1), that is ones obtained by division: Q|p(A) = Q(A)
Q↓p(A)
. Unnor-
malized conditional Q’s differ from normalized ones only by a constant factor
independent of the function’s argument.
Let us consider two sets A1, A2 ⊆ Ξp×Ξq×Ξr×Ξs such that A
↓p∪r∪s
1 = A
↓p∪r∪s
2
and with Q↓p∪q∪r↑V (A1) > 0 and Q
↓p∪q∪r↑V (A2) > 0. Then we have
Q↓p∪q∪r↑V (Ai) ·Q
↓p∪q∪s|p∪q↑V (Ai) = Q
↓p∪q∪r↑V (Ai) ·Q
↓p∪r∪s|p∪r↑V (Ai) (21)
for i=1,2, which is easily simplified to
Q↓p∪q∪s|p∪q↑V (Ai) = Q
↓p∪r∪s|p∪r↑V (Ai) (22)
As stated previously (eqn(19)), however
Q↓p∪r∪s|p∪r↑V (Ai) = Q
↓p∪r∪s|p∪r↑V (A↓p∪r∪s↑Vi ) (23)
But due to the assumption that A↓p∪r∪s1 = A
↓p∪r∪s
2 .we get from eqn(23)
Q↓p∪r∪s|p∪r↑V (A1) = Q
↓p∪r∪s|p∪r↑V (A2) (24)
and by substituting eqn(24) into eqn(22)
Q↓p∪q∪s|p∪q↑V (A1) = Q
↓p∪q∪s|p∪q↑V (A2) (25)
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Let us consider two sets A1, A2 ⊆ Ξp×Ξq×Ξr×Ξs such that A
↓p∪q∪s
1 = A
↓p∪q∪s
2
and with Q↓p∪q∪r↑V (A1) and Q
↓p∪q∪r↑V (A2) > 0. Then we have (by similar
argument)
Q↓p∪r∪s|p∪r↑V (A1) = Q
↓p∪r∪s|p∪r↑V (A2) (26)
Now we can say that if for two sets A1, A2 ⊆ Ξp×Ξq×Ξr×Ξs withQ
↓p∪q∪r↑V (A1) >
0 and Q↓p∪q∪r↑V (A2) > 0. we have always
Q↓p∪q∪s|p∪q↑V (A1) = Q
↓p∪q∪s|p∪q↑V (A2) (27)
whenever we can establish a path B1 = A1, B2, ..., Bn = A2 such that for all
i=1,...,n Q↓p∪q∪r↑V (Bi) > 0 and for all i=1,...,n-1 either B
↓p∪r∪s
i = B
↓p∪r∪s
i+1 .or
B↓p∪q∪si = B
↓p∪q∪s
i+1 .
Let us now consider those sets A ⊆ Ξp × Ξq × Ξr × Ξs with Q
↓p∪q∪r↑V (A) = 0
Then Q|p∪q∪r(A) may be assigned any value. However, to prove the claim of
the theorem, we need to assign such a value that
Q↓p∪q∪s|p∪q↑V (A) = Q↓p∪q∪s|p∪q↑V (A′) (28)
for every A′ ⊆ Ξp × Ξq × Ξr × Ξs with Q
↓p∪q∪r↑V (A′) ≥ 0. and with A↓p∪r∪s =
A′↓p∪r∪s.This means, that we have to meet the requirement that for every
path B1 = A1, B2, ..., Bn = A2 such that for all i=1,...,n-1 either B
↓p∪r∪s
i =
B↓p∪r∪si+1 .with Q
↓p∪q∪s|p∪q↑V (Bi) = Q
↓p∪q∪s|p∪q↑V (Bi+1) orB
↓p∪q∪s
i = B
↓p∪q∪s
i+1 .with
Q↓p∪r∪s|p∪r↑V (Bi) = Q
↓p∪q∪s|p∪q↑V (Bi+1). As sets Bi with Q
↓p∪q∪r↑V (Bi) = 0
cause no trouble (their conditional Q-values may be manipulated), the only
difficulty may stem from Bis with Q
↓p∪q∪r↑V (Bi) > 0 so that for all paths {Bi}
we need to have a special path {B′i} such that all of Bis with Q
↓p∪q∪r↑V (Bi) > 0
from any possible path belong to a subpath B′j , B
′
j+1, ..., B
′
j+m withQ
↓p∪q∪r↑V (B′j+k) >
0 for every k=0,...,m.
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But the existence of B’-path is a straight forward consequence of the diversity
assumption.
Hence we can always construct such a conditional that
Q↓p∪q∪s|p∪q↑V (A1) = Q
↓p∪q∪s|p∪q↑V (A2) (29)
for every pair of sets A1, A2 such that A
↓p∪r∪s
1 = A
↓p∪r∪s
2 , and especially if A2 =
(A↓p∪r∪s2 )
↑p∪q∪r∪s. But the latter means that this conditional Bel↓p∪q∪s|p∪q↑V is
compressibly independent of q, so that in fact there exists a conditional that
Bel↓p∪q∪s|p∪q↑V = Bel↓p∪s|p↑V (30)
This implies again that:
Bel = Bel↓p∪s|p ⊕ Bel↓p∪q∪r (31)
which implies via theorem 3 that q∪r and s are independent given p. Q.e.d.✷
6 Discussion
Two approaches of structuring (factorization, decomposition) of Dempster-Shafer
joint belief functions from literature, of Cano et al. [1] and of Shenoy [9], have been
reviewed with special emphasis on their capability to capture and exploit indepen-
dence for purposes of factorization in terms of graphoidal structure. It has been
demonstrated that in Cano et al. [1] framework some belief functions factorable
graphoidally in the sense of Shenoy [9] cannot be factored and hence do not corre-
spond to conditional independence in the sense of Cano et al. [1]. On the other hand,
though conditional independence is defined in a much broader sense in Shenoy’s pa-
per [9], Shenoy demonstrates that his notion of independence is a graphoidal relation,
but only for positive normal valuations. This actually means that probabilistic be-
lief functions, as not possessing positive normal valuations, are actually excluded
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from consideration. Shenoy’s and Cano et al.’s notions of (graphoidal) independence
coincide for positive normal valuations whenever respective Cano et al.s (a priori)
conditional belief function exists.
The exclusion of probabilistic belief functions from graphoidal structuring is re-
markable because of the general claim that DS belief functions constitute a general-
ization of probability distributions. For VBS consisting of probability distributions
as such, Shenoy’s notion of positive valuation has been identified as requirement of
a probability distribution without null values in any cell. Why should then proba-
bilistic belief functions within VBS of DS belief functions with non-zero masses at
every singleton not fulfill requirements of graphoidal independence ?
Widening of the class of VBS of DS belief functions in such a way as to make
probabilistic belief functions with non-zero masses at every singleton fulfill require-
ments of graphoidal independence was one of goals of this investigation. To achieve
this goal, this paper verifies the notion of independence in that it requires that the
Q-function (commonality function) is not null for singleton sets. In theorem 4 it
has been demonstrated that such a notion of independence fulfills the requirement
of intersection, the only one property of Shenoy’s notion of independence for which
positive normal valuation is required. This new notion of independence covers clearly
the Shenoy’s notion of positive normal independence as a special cases, because in
proper belief functions Q(Ξ) > 0 implies Q(A) > 0 for every A ⊆ Ξ, including all
singletons. Also, probabilistic independence in probabilistic belief functions with
non-zero masses at every singleton qualifies as a special case of the new notion of
(intrinsic) independence.
As a pre-requisite for this result, notion of conditionality as such has been revis-
ited. Instead of Cano’s a priori conditional belief functions and Shenoy’s (normal)
conditional belief functions a broader notion of (anti)conditional belief functions has
been introduced. Both Shenoy’s and Cano’s conditionals can be treated as special
cases of conditionals introduced in definition 6. Compared to Cano et al’s notion of
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(a priori) conditionality, we must state that whenever Cano conditional exists, our
exists, but not vice versa.
One difference to Shenoy’s approach is important: we do not require that there
exists a unique conditional for a given belief function and the set of conditioning
variables (we do not require positive valuations). Under these circumstances, if
graphoidal properties are to be demonstrated, a shift from equality relations to ex-
istential equality relations has to be made. In this spirit, it has been demonstrated
that the graphoidal property of intersection is fulfilled for conditional independence
relationship not only for Shenoy’s positive normal but also for Shenoy’s normal val-
uations with positive Q’s on singleton sets. Hence one can conclude that a much
broader class of conditional factorizations of belief functions has graphoidal proper-
ties than those with Cano’s specific a-priori conditionals.
Widening the notion of conditionality from a single function to a family of func-
tions has several consequences for general normal valuations. In probability calculus,
if variables X,Y are independent given Z, then we understand that P (X|Z, Y ) =
P (X|Z) that is conditional of X given Z,Y can be derived from X,Z alone. Given
Shenoy’s notion of conditionality, an equation like this is not valid for DST, as r⊥s|v
is equivalent to γ(r|s∪ v) = γ(r|v)⊕ τγ(s∪v) that is knowledge of r,v alone (γ(r|v)) is
insufficient to construct γ(r|s∪v) (because member identity τγ(s∪v) of γ(s∪v) is also
required). However, under theorem 1, in the class of conditionals given by definition
6 this is possible - if variables r, s are independent given v, then a (and via theorem
2 every) Bel↓r∪v|v is a legitimate Bel|v∪s.
Furthermore, in probability theory conditional probability may be viewed as a kind
of generalization of knowledge, ”freeing” the experience from the particular distri-
bution of the conditioning variable. Invariance of the conditional distribution over
various samples indicates detection of intrinsic relationship. Given Shenoy’s condi-
tioning of belief functions, even if we have an intrinsic relationship among variables,
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we will get different conditional belief functions for different ”samples” of joint belief
distribution. On the other hand, the definition 6 of conditionality ensures that in
such cases the various samples will share (at least one) common (anti)conditional.
(This is due to theorem 1 as it corresponds to compressible independence of a vari-
able levels of which generate these sample belief functions.)
We cannot overlook that, under validity of theorems 1-4, the model of decomposition
of DS belief functions proposed in [4] combines the merits of both Cano et al. [1]
and of Shenoy/Shafer [8] approaches to decomposition of DS belief functions as on
the one hand no simpler factorization (in terms of number of variables in hypern-
odes) into a hypertree of Shenoy/Shafer (hence for propagation of uncertainty using
their method) exists than one consisting of conditional factors (paralleling bayesian
networks) proposed in [4]; and on the other hand the decomposition proposed in [4]
captures (conditional and unconditional) independence among variables for a much
broader class of belief distributions than Cano et al. framework does.
Some words must be said about disadvantages of the intrinsic conditional inde-
pendence. While Shenoy’s positive normal independence requires only to check for
presence of a single focal point (the universe focal point), the intrinsic independence
requires checking every singleton set of the universe (which may not necessarily be a
focal point of the distribution). The question may be formulated whether one could
change Shenoy’s normal valuation to positive normal valuation simply by adding
a focal point for the universe set. This question seems to have the answer NO as
then e.g. a probabilistic belief distribution with two unconditionally independent
variables, each having domain with cardinality three or more would then turn to a
distribution in dependent variables (unless one adds some other focal points).
Further research concerning the class of valuations possessing notion of condi-
tional independence and fulfilling graphoidal axioms seems to be necessary. In par-
ticular we can ask, whether one, or two or more Q-values of singletons equal zero will
harm the graphoidal properties. One should also ask what can be concluded about
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graphoidal properties if we are unable to investigate all focal points of the whole dis-
tribution, but only of its projections onto subsets of the set of variables containing
up to, say, k variables ? Currently we can say that if we were able to construct a
belief network of the type defined in [4], and are able to verify that each factor in
this belief network factorization fulfills the requirement of diversity, then the com-
bined distribution of all factors will do. However, we cannot ensure (by investigating
subsets of variables with cardinality up to k only) that the combined distribution
is in fact a proper belief function - we can only check that this is a pseudo-belief
distribution. This means that projections of the combined distribution may fail to
be diverse.
7 Conclusions
1. A new notion of conditionals (anticonditionals) has been introduced for Dempster-
Shafer belief functions. It is characterized by the fact that in general many
belief functions can be considered as a conditional belief function of a given
belief function.
2. Both Shenoy’s [9] and Cano’s [1] conditionals can be treated as special cases
of conditionals introduced in this paper.
3. In the new definition of conditionality, if variables r, s are independent given
v, then every conditioning of the belief function marginalized onto v ∪ r on v
is a legitimate conditional for the original belief function conditioned on v ∪ s.
This property is not valid for Shenoy’s notion of conditioning.
4. The notion of compressible independence of a belief distribution from a variable
has been introduced in that a belief function Bel defined over the space spanned
by the set of variables V is compressibly independent of a subset p of V iff
Bel↓V −p↑V = Bel.
28 MIECZYS lAW A. K lOPOTEK (Version 02)
5. A new notion of conditional independence (intrinsic independence) for proper
belief functions has been introduced characterized by the fact that beside exis-
tence of a compressibly independent conditional also the commonality function
shall take non-zero values at all singleton sets.
6. For the DS belief functions, intrinsic independence relation fulfills the graphoidal
axioms of [5].
7. This new notion of intrinsic (conditional) independence generalizes the Shenoy’s
notion of positive normal independence with the latter as its special case
8. Also, probabilistic independence in probabilistic belief functions with non-zero
masses at every singleton qualifies as a special case of the new notion of (in-
trinsic) independence - hence having graphoidal properties within DS belief
function framework. Probabilistic belief functions are not positive normal val-
uations in the sense of Shenoy [9], hence were not proven to have this property
within Shenoy’s VBS framework (though at the same time probability distri-
butions had this property within Shenoy’s VBS).
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